“The
2012 Tuareg Revolt: Regional
Identities and Barriers to Reconciliation” – Barbara A. Worley, Ph.D.
© Copyright Barbara
A. Worley 2012
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Worley, Barbara A.
2012 “The 2012 Tuareg Revolt: Regional Identities and Barriers to
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“The 2012 Tuareg Revolt:
Regional Identities and Barriers to Reconciliation”
Prof. Barbara A. Worley
July 30, 2012
THREE CONFLICTS IN MALI, 2012
In the first half of 2012, the Republic of Mali was plunged
into three conflicts:
(1) Tuareg separatists in the north
(National Movement for Liberation of Azawad, MNLA) undertook a revolt against
Mali and declared the independence of the northern portion of Mali, which they
call Azawad.
(2) During the fighting, a military
junta in the south toppled the Mali government at Bamako, followed by a failed counter-coup.
(3) Tuareg jihadists in the north (Ansar
al-Din), who had been fighting alongside the Tuareg revolutionists, took
control of the north from MNLA. Ansar
al-Din was joined by its parent group, al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM),
and AQIM’s newest offshoot, Movement for Uniqueness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO). The three militant Islamist groups began
implementing strict Sharia practices in Azawad, drove MNLA out of the major
cities, and announced their intention to spread Sharia across the rest of Mali.
REGIONAL IDENTITIES
South versus North
The 2012 “Tuareg revolt” in Mali is often characterized as
an identity split between “the south” and “the north.” Tuaregs, who are the predominant
population of the north, have said that the long history of injustices and
abuses against their people, along with southerner’s racialized hostility
toward Tuaregs, makes it impossible to reconcile the two regions.
Illustrations of the
Regional Divide
“The
first two days of February will remain forever in the history of our people. No
one will forget these two days when Malians in the south drove Tuaregs from
their homes, shouting "Death to the Tuaregs!"
On February 1-2, 2012, families and friends of Malian
soldiers began filling the streets and attacking Tuareg civilians, businesses,
homes, and vehicles in Bamako, Kati, Segou, Sikasso, Koulikoro, and Gao.
They were reacting to the deaths of
soldiers in the north. Tuareg
sources reported that the attacks began on February 1 at a large Tuareg-owned
pharmacy in Kati near the military base.
Mobs began a looting rampage, burning Tuareg homes and chasing Tuareg
families, shouting "Death to the
Tuaregs!"
A Tuareg woman, Miriam
,
whom I have known since 2008, is a member of a large Tuareg family that has
businesses and homes in Bamako and Kati, including the pharmacy at Kati.
Miriam and her husband, a Malian army officer, were living in Kati at the time
of the uprisings. Their home
across from the Kati army base was looted and burned. Everyone in their
extended family was targeted because they were Tuaregs, according to Miriam.
There is a video of the looting on YouTube
.
The video shows, at 0.47 minutes, a policeman riding through the looting scene on
a moped. Tuaregs allege that military and police did nothing to stop the
rioters or to protect the Tuareg civilians who were being attacked. In
panic and fear, Tuareg families began fleeing Mali immediately. They could no longer trust the state to
protect them from fellow citizens.
According to Tuareg sources, an important factor in the mass
exodus of refugees was the violence and hostility directed toward “anyone white
who might look like a Touareg or an Arab of the Azawad.”
Eyewitness Assan Midal, a Tuareg who
works as a tour guide in Bamako, said “I saw with my own eyes people being
attacked, stores getting looted, cars being set on fire. People with light skin (Arabs and
Tuaregs) were being targeted.”
President Amadou Toumani Touré
felt the need to urge Malians not to “confuse” Tuareg civilians with the Tuareg
rebels. The threats and damages to
homes and property belonging to Tuaregs were so alarming, that “many senior
Tuareg officials and ministers were forced to take refuge in neighboring
countries.”
I have included the above accounts because they graphically
illustrate the nature of regional divisions in Mali in photographs, video, and
eyewitness testimony. Among
peoples of “the south,” there exists intense hostility against peoples
perceived as having “white” skin color, specifically Tuareg people. This hostility is not limited to the
events of February 1-2, 2012. The
Tuareg people say they have been living in fear of hatred and exclusion since
Mali’s independence from France in 1960.
Skin Color and
Regional Divisions
In Mali, the south-north division appears to be based on
southerner’s perceptions of northerners’ skin color. Tuaregs with
whom I have spoken tell me that the southerners characterize themselves as
“blacks” and they think of the Tuaregs and Arabs as “whites.” Tuaregs, the majority group in the
north, say that Tuaregs are the principle target of the southerners’ animosity.
Religion is not a factor. Some 90% of the people of both southern and northern Mali
are Muslim, with the remainder animist, and 1% Christian
.
There are cultural differences between southerners and northerners,
but the southerners seem focused on the northerners’ skin color.
Over the decades
since colonialization and independence, racialized discrimination based on skin
color has become a dominant theme in the split between south and north
Mali. Conflicts between
southerners and Tuareg people over the past two decades have brought this
black/white consciousness into intense focus. Especially with the 1990s Tuareg rebellions, the peoples of
southern Mali began characterizing Tuaregs in terms of a black-white racial
dichotomy, according to Tuareg sources.
Southerners – the predominant
Bambara, along with the Songhay – view themselves as “blacks.” Today, the southerner’s perception of
“whites” lumps Tuaregs (who do not think of themselves as “white”) with Arabs.
This term “white” is not a
compliment. It is used as a
pejorative, in a discriminatory way.
The term “white” historically stems from a usage for Arabs
. According to Tuareg sources, this is
because people in the south tend to think of Arabs and Tuaregs as “the same
people,” and cannot tell them apart – much the way that most Westerners
do. Both Tuaregs and Arabs wear
turbans and ride camels. But they
are not “the same people.”
The skin color factor is significant in understanding the regional
hostility – but racism is a symptom of the more serious frustrations that the
citizens of Mali have been facing since independence: seriously damaging corruption by political elites that
impedes real progress toward democracy and economic development. Corruption exists in all countries; but
in a country where the majority of people live on a dollar a day or less, high
levels of corruption are seriously damaging to the morale and functioning of society
as a whole. The corruption in Mali
has kept the country poor, even though Mali has significant resources in gold,
uranium, and oil.
Unfortunately, racism can become a powerful motivator for
frustrated citizens. Racism is a
means of excluding a sector of the population based on skin color. In a democracy, everybody needs to be
included. For decades, the
national government in Mali, dominated by the Bambara in the south, has
stigmatized, excluded, and abused members of the Tuareg population. Tuaregs feel that it is based on their
skin color.
Factors such as racial or ethnic hatred may not be the
ultimate cause of conflict.
However, they can lead to mass rioting and genocide. Tuaregs feel that numerous
massacres and summary executions of Tuareg civilians over the decades are a
sign of ongoing genocidal tendencies that could erupt into something bigger at
any time.
The Northerners
Paradoxically, only
a small percentage of the people in the north
view themselves as whites, and these are the Arabs. The majority population in the north
(as much as 90 percent, by some accounts
)
is Tuareg. Most Tuaregs view
themselves as “red” (
ichaggaghan, in
Temasheq).
Tuaregs whose ancestors were
slaves view themselves as “black”
(ikawellan). These are known as Bella, the
Songhay word for ‘slaves’ which was applied to them by French colonialists.
The north includes
several other peoples: Songhay,
Fulani, and Arabs. The Songhay
view themselves as “black.” The
Fulani view themselves as either “red” or “black,” depending on the particular
group. Only a small percentage of
the population in the north actually
regards themselves as “whites,” and these are the Arabs.
Like all humans, the
Tuareg people have a mixed genetic background. Geneticists have determined that the ancestors of Tuaregs over
the past 10,000 years came together as a group in the Sahara from 4 different
regions: Europe, Western Asia, East Africa, and sub-Saharan Africa.
Tuaregs have a wide range of “light”
and “dark” skin color because of this diversity.
From the Tuareg
perspective, however, skin color is not the major determinant of their
identity. Tuaregs identify
themselves as people whose native language is the Tuareg language,
Temasheq. Tuaregs do not call
themselves “Tuaregs
,” but Kel
Temasheq, ‘people who speak Temasheq.’
The Tuaregs are Not Arabs
The Tuaregs are not the
same as Arabs. This crucial point
escapes many Westerners, as well as many Malians. Tuaregs are indigenous peoples of North Africa, and Arabs
originated in Saudi Arabia.
Tuaregs speak a Berber language
,
and Arabs speak Arabic
. Tuaregs are “red” or “black,” but not
“white” like Arabs.
Differences between
Tuareg culture and Arab culture are enormous. For example, Tuareg women have a public presence, do not
wear veils, and have political positions and influence, whereas Arab women are
often sequestered, wear veils, and do not have a public presence. Tuaregs practice courting before
marriage, allow women to divorce, and regularly assign custody of children to
their mothers, which is not normally the case for Arabs in Mali. The treatment
of women is a major divide between Tuaregs and Arabs.
Both Tuaregs and
Arabs ride camels, but their camel saddles are entirely different; the Tuareg
camel saddle has a tall, highly decorated back and a large three-pronged structure
on the front to hold onto, while the Arab camel saddle lacks these
features. Both Tuareg and Arab men
wear turbans, but Tuaregs use part of the cloth from the turban to veil their
faces, to maintain respectful social interactions
. Tuareg men wear long pants that cover
their ankles; Arab men prefer shorter pants that show the ankle. Tuaregs may wear mustaches, and sometimes
beards, but prefer clean-shaven faces otherwise; Arabs in Mali usually prefer
full-length beards, and this is related to religious beliefs.
The most significant
difference between Tuaregs and Arabs, apart from the status of women, has to do
with religion.
The Tuaregs practice
a different kind of Islam than Arabs, although both are Sunni Muslims. Tuaregs practice a moderate or “tolerant”
form of Islam of the Malikki school that is significantly combined with
animistic spiritual beliefs and worship of saints, which in some areas is
connected with mystical, Sufi Islam.
I have been told that this type of “tolerant” Islam is practiced by
nearly all of the other peoples of Mali, with the exception of Arabs, who
prefer Sharia to regulate everyday problems.
Tuaregs believe in
God and in saying their prayers. But
they do not practice Sharia.
Tuaregs have a strong moral code, ashaq,
in Temajeq – ‘respect’ for others.
Tuareg morality places a strong injunction against men hitting or raping
women, or harming them in any manner.
Tuaregs as a rule do not use violence on their children as
punishment. Tuaregs do not believe
in stoning, flogging, or cutting off the hand of a thief, and they are
adamantly against that sort of ideology.
From the Tuareg
perspective, Arabs practice a “different kind of religion” – “it’s not the
Islam we were bought up with,” Tuaregs say. “The Tuaregs are Muslim, but do not know Sharia. We are an open people, and our culture,
morals, and customs do not go with Sharia.”
Playing the “Slavery Card”
Western media
accounts often assume that the hostility of peoples of the south toward the
Tuaregs is about a grievance having to do with “historically ruthless
slave-raids.”
The “slavery card” has often been
played against the Tuareg to sway Western support against them. However, we must keep in mind that
raiding, trading, and keeping slaves was practiced by many peoples of Africa,
and by ancestors of practically all the cultural groups in Mali. The dominant Bambara culture in Mali
were no exception:
“One pagan state that was a major
supplier of slaves was the Bambara state of Segu, located on the banks of the
Niger River and founded in the early seventeenth century in the wake of
Songhay’s disintegration. Its first ruler, Kalajan Kulubali, attracted a
following of young men who ravaged the countryside. . . . Bands of men would
waylay caravans, or kidnap children and the occasional farmer in his field. . .
. So many slaves were taken in these campaigns that Segu became a major source
of slaves for the European slave-ships in the Senegambia basin.”
The “slavery card” is a propaganda tool that is used for
certain purposes: to stigmatize a
people unjustly, to motivate Westerners and others to sympathize with the
accusers, and to downplay or ignore the legitimate grievances of the people who
are accused. The United States,
along with many European countries, also has a history of slavery. It is a history that we share with many
African peoples. Like Americans
and Europeans, African peoples are making the effort to move past that
history.
The Other Problem: Islamism and Extremism
There is a third “identity”
conflict between the armed Islamists and everybody else. As it stands now, heavily armed
jihadists have control of more than half of Mali. They are applying strict Sharia – with shocking results
similar to those of the Taliban in Afghanistan – and have stated their intent
to continue to spread. Since 2003,
AQIM has been targeting European and American travellers in the Sahara, to
kidnap them for ransom. In July 2012,
the extremists announced their intention to bring their jihad to the U.S.
Azawad has become a center of the
global terror threat.
Reconciliation of south and north is impossible with extremists in
control.
The spread of armed Islamism
is germaine to understanding the overall conflict in Mali. Islamism is about “religion,” but it can
also have to do with the promotion of significant political and economic
networks. The application of strict
Sharia is a means of controlling a population by individuals who wish to
monopolize the political and economic networks.
The expansion of
Islamism in West Africa has been explained as “a growing conflict over culture
and identity that has economic and political as well as social and cultural
applications.”
In southern Niger, for example, the Izala Islamist movement has been replacing traditional Sufi Islam since the
early 1990s
. Women’s seclusion and veiling are now
common practices in areas where this movement has spread. In Mali, along with the spread of
Islamist religious ideology come certain forms of political control and
economic enterprise.
For the past decade,
the Islamist terror group AQIM
originating in Algeria, has been connected with the multi-billion dollar
narcotics, weapons, and cigarette traffick
across the Sahara. This lucrative
business is supplemented by occasional kidnappings
of Europeans for ransom. Tuaregs
have alleged that AQIM also gets funding from certain people or countries,
including Algeria and Qatar
. One observer is dubious
,
but admits “Anything remains possible.”
The network of certain powerful Arab families in Mali and Algeria involved in
the trans-Saharan traffick has been described in detail
,
but the relationship of this network with AQIM is unclear.
AQIM began to
operate in Mali nearly ten years ago and gradually built up its force. Tuaregs have alleged that Tuareg army
soldiers on patrol discovered an AQIM installation within fifteen kilometers of
a Malian army base, and were told by their commanders to ignore it. Tuareg sources claim that certain
Malian government and military officials were supporting AQIM, and that Mali
has not cooperated with the U.S. in fighting it. AQIM, with a
secure foothold in Mali, took advantage of the Tuareg struggle for independence
to capture the north, through superior weaponry and financing.
Ansar al-Din
is an offshoot of AQIM and is controlled by AQIM. Tuareg sources allege that Iyad ag Ghaly controls the
traffick through Azawad. The Ansar
al-Din group consists of only about two dozen Tuareg individuals, largely
relatives and clan members of Iyad ag Ghaly, along with several hundred Arabs
and Songhay individuals
. The Ansar al-Din group, founded by
Tuareg Iyad ag Ghaly, is an anomaly.
It is the only armed Islamist group that has any Tuareg members.
Islamism has been
vigorously rejected by Tuaregs, because of the enormous restrictions and
changes it would impose on Tuareg culture. Islamism would destroy Tuareg culture. Tuareg cultural identity is heavily
invested in values that honor women and promote tolerant Muslim practices. The exception to this pattern is the
emergence of the Ansar al-Din group.
The underlying
political motive of the Tuareg-founded Ansar al Din group, which is said to be
financed and supported by the terror group AQIM originating in Algeria, appears
to be more than simply “religion.”
Many Tuaregs
feel that
the real purpose of the Ansar al-Din group is to assist AQIM in controlling the
trans-Sahara narco- and weapons-traffick, as well as the kidnapping of
Westerners for ransom.
In addition to the
Tuareg-led Ansar al Din group, certain Arab clans, as well as AQIM and MUJAO
,
are assisting Ansar al Din in enforcing strict Sharia on Tuaregs in Kidal,
Timbuktu, and Gao, as a means of controlling the population, according to the
accounts of many Tuaregs. Certain
Arab clans in Mali, connected through trans-national networks centered in
Algeria, control the trans-Saharan traffick
.
Nationalism
Westerners have been
confused about the reasons for the Tuareg revolt. From the Tuareg viewpoint, the MNLA revolution is not simply about Tuaregs – it is about
nationalism. With the
understanding that “the north” is not 100% Tuareg, the leaders of MNLA have
emphasized that they are multi-ethnic, and that their goal is a secular, democratic
nation.
The problem of reconciliation
The Tuareg people
have been subjected to massacres, stigmatization, and exclusion for over 100
years. The French subdued them
with great difficulty, because the Tuaregs resisted. Since independence, the Tuaregs in Mali have rebelled
against the state in 1962-1964, 1990-1996, 2006-2009 and 2012, in
attempts to gain autonomy and relief from what they have experienced as an
oppressive government.
Because the Tuaregs
were seen as a threat to French control, they were placed off-limits following
colonization. Tuaregs remained
inaccessible to researchers until the 1980s; Kidal was largely off-limits after that because of the
rebellions.
. This explains why there was so little
anthropological fieldwork among Tuaregs until relatively recently.
Over the years the Tuaregs have been the target of acute
economic and political marginalization, as well as serious violations of human
rights that have never been investigated or recognized by the international community. The Tuaregs have lived in fear of
retaliation if they speak out and pursue these claims.
I present here (see Appendix I) a testament to the history
of injustice during the rebellion of 1990-1995 showing a day-by-day
account of pillaging, massacres of civilians, and extrajudicial executions of Tuaregs
committed by Mali, including an “anti-white” demonstration against Tuaregs. These deep wounds present an enormous
problem for reconciliation, one which the Tuaregs say is impossible.
Next, I present (See Appendix II) testimony given to me
personally by a 27-year old university-educated Tuareg refugee
from the Timbuktu region who was among the people interviewed by Erin Burnett
for CNN on the July 24, 2012 broadcast.
Finally, I would also like to include a reference to
the testimony (See Appendix III) of one of the senior MNLA commanders, Colonel
Machkanani
. He provides a personal account of
government atrocities he experienced, recorded at Gao in early April, 2012
Short Biography
Barbara Worley is a faculty member in the Department of
Anthropology at the University of Massachusetts in Boston. She teaches a wide range of
anthropology courses, including Peoples and Cultures of Africa. Dr. Worley has an M.A., M.Phil. and
Ph.D. in anthropology from Columbia University in New York. Her current research is focused on the
2012 Tuareg crisis. She is writing
a book on Tuareg culture and identity.
Prof. Worley has 38 years of experience working with Tuaregs
in Niger, Mali, and Algeria. She
has undertaken extensive fieldwork totalling nearly four years living among
Tuaregs. She has driven overland
through much of West and North Africa and the Sahara, including Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Niger,
Mali, and Senegal. She conducted
fieldwork in Temasheq, the Tuareg language. She speaks French, and studied Hausa, Arabic, and Pharaonic
Egyptian for her earlier linguistics studies of Temasheq. Her research encompasses other peoples
and cultures with whom the Tuaregs have social relations, especially the Hausa,
Fulani, Arabs, and Songhay.
Prof. Worley’s fieldwork and research have been funded
by several agencies and institutions.
These include Fulbright-Hays, the Social Science Research Council, the
Woodrow Wilson Foundation, the American Council of Learned Societies, and the
Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research. She has received faculty grants through the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology (Austin Kelly III research grant and Richard Carly Hunt
Memorial Fellowship), as well as travel and research funds through the
University of Massachusetts.
1990-1995 History of pillaging,
massacres of civilians, and extrajudicial executions of Tuaregs committed by
Mali, including “anti-white” demonstration
HISTOIRIQUE JOUR PAR JOUR de tous les massacres commis par
le Mali de 1990 à 1995
27/07/90 Massacre of 12 elderly, near Tejerert
12/07/90 Massacre of 22 people at Tawarde, among the refugees returned from
Algeria
29/07/90 7 Tuaregs murdered and 12 arrested, at Alkit
22/08/90 12 Touaregs murdered at Zakak
24/08/90 Public execution of 11 Tuaregs including a woman, at Gao
26/08/90 Execution of 5 Tuaregs at Menaka
27/08/90 Execution of 9 Algerian Tuaregs at Kidal and Fanfi
12/08/90 Execution of 3 people at Kidal
13/08/90 Massacre of 62 people at Sehene and 1 at Kidal
23/08/90 Execution of 9 people at Tadaloq and 1 at Gao
23/09/90 Execution of 8 people at Inakarot and 1 at Tin-Essako
28/04/91 Pillaging of Tuareg and Moor families at Gao, 2 dead, deportation of
325 people at Intahaqa
12/05/91 Execution of 35 people and demonstrations at Timbuktu
14/05/91 Pillaging at Sévaré
15/05/91 Vandalism at Diré, Goundam and Bamako on Tuaregs and Moors
16/05/91 Pillaging at Douentza
17/05/91 Pillaging at Niono
22/05/91 Attack on Goundam: 15 dead; rebels: 2 dead and 1 wounded; 37 notables publicly
shot at Léré
28/05/91 Execution of 9 people at Larneb
12/07/91 Execution of 3 people at Menaka
15/07/91 Massacre of 25 people at N'Garma north of Léré
27/07/91 Execution of 36 people at Ain Sebil near Timbuktu
31/07/91 Massacre of 36 people around Timbuktu
13/08/91 3 FIAA fighters assassinated by the army at Timbuktu, after the peace
accords.
19/09/91 Massacre of 72 people at Fatihamane, Goundam
12/12/91 Death of 12 people at Timbuktu
5/03/92 Execution of 9
people at Léré
12/03/92 Execution of 13 people at Farach, Goundam
15/03/92 Execution of 9 Tuareg bellas at Léré
16-17/05/92 Summary execution of 12 people at Gossi
28/06/92 Installation of the President, Alpha O. KONARE; Execution of 12 people
at Djindi, Goundam
17/06/92 4 nomads killed at Garbamé
22/06/92 14 people killed at Bourem
27/06/92 Execution of 9 people at Gao
22/07/92 Execution of 14 people at Fia, Bourem
25/08/92 Execution of 4 people at Barghabé, Gourma
28/01/93 Execution of 5 Nigerien Tuaregs at Menaka
25/02/94 Assassination of 1 person by l'ARLA [militia] at Inminas, near Gao
21/04/94 4 Tuaregs executed at Menaka, and demonstrations
12/05/94 Execution of 5 young Tuaregs at Diré and 13 at Tessit
26/05/94 Assassination of 9 camel herders near Tacharane, attributed to MPGK
27/06/94 7 integrated fighters, throats slit by their colleagues in the army at
Gourma Rharous
9/06/94 Massacre of 6 people
at Niafunké and 2 people burned at Tonka
12/06/94 Massacre of 26 Tuaregs and Moors at Andéramboukane
17/06/94 Attempt to assassinate the customs guide at Kidal
12-29/06/94 Massacre of 52 civilians at Timbuktu
19/06/94 Massacre of 72 people at Ber, “anti-white” demonstrations at Mopti: 2 deaths
16/08/94 Massacre of civilians at Dofana, 22 deaths
25/12/94 Assassination of Jean-Claude BERBERAT and 2 of his colleagues of the Coop
Suisseat Niafunké
13/12/94 Massacre of 42 civilians at Bintagoungou
22/12/94 Gao: 15 civilian deaths
23/12/94 Massacre of more than 53 Tuareg and Moor civilians at Gao and at a village
of Kel Essuk, including the elderly chief
??/11/94 16 Tuaregs executed at
Intahaka, of which 5 were women
30/11/94 16 notables of kal Ihkakane executed at Rharous
13/12/94 Massacre of 18 people at Amasakor, Niafunké
26/04/95 Execution of 17 Tuaergs at Izilili, near Ménaka
APPENDIX II
Testimony
given to me personally by a 27-year old university-educated Tuareg refugee
from the Timbuktu region who was among the people interviewed by Erin Burnett
for CNN on the July 24, 2012 broadcast.
We need the International Community to know that there has been a genocide
in northern Mali from 1963 to 2012 – especially from 1990 to 1996. What was happening in
northern Mali during this time was
only surpassed by Rwanda.
I remember in 1991, the
army of Mali came
to my village two days after a rebel attack. At that time, I was a
child. They took all of the
high-level Tuaregs who worked with the Norwegian
Church Aid (NEA) and they
assassinated all of them between Gossi and
Gourma Rharous. The
survivors who escaped before
the army got to their homes
included my big brother, [name
protected] and my uncle, [name
protected]. Both are still alive, and are refugees in Burkina Faso.
Tuareg families, livestock herders, were murdered by the Malian
army without anyone
knowing. And
afterward they said on the radio they had killed rebels. The [village] markets were closed
on account of the “red skins” or “rebels.”
A militia of Songay was formed to
exterminate the Tuaregs who
lived in villages. The militia that
killed Tuareg civilians was
called cocadje, which in Bambara
means “cleansing.”
The cities where they raped and massacred are Gossi, Rharous,
Gourma, Lere, Timbuktu,
and Gao. At Gao,
many Tuaregs were
burned.
If we had hard feelings, we
would kill all of them them without
thinking. But
we must forget all of this to deal with
our friends the Songhay. Mali is trying to sway Songhay by telling them that the Tuaregs
regard the Songhay as slaves.
The Tuareg people are faced with
fighting Mali, Algeria, certain Arab and Songhay militias, and terrorists. We have no choice left.
I am asking the International Community to settle the Tuareg’s
problems.”
Filmed testimony of
one of the senior MNLA commanders, Colonel Machkanani. He provides an account of
government atrocities he personally experienced, and reasons for the rebellions.
The recording was
made after the MNLA victory at Gao in early April, 2012, before the Islamists
took over.
I went to Libya as a youth in the early
1970s [during the drought] to train in the army, and later returned to Mali to
take part in the 1990s revolution.
The men [of my unit] were arrested and most of them died after being
tortured between 8 AM-2 PM, by army soldiers using electricity, along with
deprivation of water and food.
After that, the soldiers brought in an
85-year old traditional chief of one of the Tuareg tribes, along with ten
youths, to be tortured in the same manner. We were kept bound in prison. The elderly chief was accused wrongly; he was innocent. They killed him by torturing him repeatedly.
The soldiers then dismembered the ten
youths, cutting off their arms and legs, and beheading them. The few men who survived were made to
applaud each time the soldiers killed one of their comrades. A few of us escaped at one point.
I am asking the International Criminal
court (ICC) to pursue the Malian officers who were the authors of these
crimes. We want justice done for
these innocent civilians.
The following week, the army attacked
and burned a village of Tuaregs of the religious caste. Among them were elderly, women, and
children. The army prevented the
media from going there and reporting on it. The soldiers burned the civilians; not a single one was left
alive, including women and children.
The common graves where these people are buried can still be located
near Gao.
We are asking the ICC to undertake an
enquiry into these crimes and pursue the perpetrators for which we have
proof.
The soldiers criss-crossed the nomad
camps, pouring gasoline and lighting fires, to kill the civilian
populations. They did not even
kill them with a bullet; they preferred to use gasoline to save their
bullets.
During this time, the Malian
authorities kept journalists from coming to the area. The world does not know about all these crimes.
After we were subjected to all of that,
the Malian authorities did nothing for us. They did not try to make things better. They did not even construct a
hospital. Mali wanted that us, the
Tuareg people, to disappear in 1973.
They even poisoned our wells that we have to use for drinking
water.
It is true, there have been many
deaths, but the international community is not paying attention, and this
wounds us profoundly.
Even animals are better protected than
we are. There are organizations
that defend and protect animals.
But for the Tuaregs, no one cares about them or protects them.
Thank God for these victories that our
fighters have realized. It is a
great thing to liberate our territory.
It is a proof of love for the earth and our ancestors.
We are asking that the Malian officers
who committed these crimes be brought to court, along with those who attacked
Tegerert, who committed atrocious crimes, who burned the population, the
houses, and the livestock. The
Malian authorities know all of that, and they keep the media from coming to
reveal the truth.
If the ICC comes, we will show the
proof of all of it. The Malian
authorities know all these crimes.
They tied up elderly people and burned
them, and put them in common graves. Even animals have more rights than us,
why? While we are peaceful, we
do not want to hurt anybody, we do not want any other land, we only seek our
interests and the right to exist, free and dignified.
Now that we are liberated, in our hearts, we have never forgotten the
injustices done to our relatives and our people. It is thus that we have sought a new strategy to liberate
our land from the unjust occupation of the Malian army that is killing our
population, in the full view of everyone, without any reactions.
Salima Tlemçani. “Rebellion au Nord du Mali: La crise provoque l’exode de 50,000
Touareg at Arabes maliens.” El
Watan. February 20, 2012. Retrieved on the Internet July 29,
2012. http://www.elwatan.com//actualite/la-crise-provoque-l-exode-de-50-000-touareg-et-arabes-maliens-20-02-2012-159728_109.php
“Ansar Dine, allié du MNLA menace la France et les Etats
Unis.” Video uploaded on YouTube
July 9, 2012 by Bouba Konare. 1:45
minutes. Retrieved on the Internet July 29,
2012. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d1OcSRILVc0&feature=related
The MoorNextDoor. “RE: Canard Enchaîné, Qatar in northern
Mali and Algeria”
Ansar
al-Din is a splinter group of AQIM.
It is often spelled the way Tuaregs pronounce it, Ansar Adine, or
Ansaradin. Ansar al-Din,
‘supporters of Islam” or ‘defenders of the faith, was founded by
Tuareg
rebel leader Iyad ag Ghali on December 15, 2011. Retreived from the Internet
July 27, 2012. http://www.memrijttm.org/content/en/blog_personal.htm?id=5631¶m=GJN
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/01/20121274447237703.html
Nicolaisen, Johannes. 1963. Ecology
and Culture of the Pastoral Tuareg.
Copenhagen: National
Museum. Page 566 ff.
Several books, mostly
historical analyses, that have appeared in recent years include:
M.
T.-F. Maiga. 1997. Le
Mali: de la secheresse a la rebellion nomade. Chronique et analyse d’un double phenomene du
contre-developpement en Afrique sahelienne. Paris: L’Harmattan.
Pierre
Boilley. 1999. Les
Touaregs Kel Adagh. Dependances et
revoltes: du Soudan francais au Mali contemporain. Paris: Karthala.
Hureiki
Jacques. 2003. Essai
sur les origines des Touaregs: Herméneutique culturelle des
Touaregs de la région de Tombouctou. Paris:
Karthala.
Baz
Le Cocq. 2010. Disputed
Desert : Decolonisation, Competing Nationalisms and Tuareg Rebellions in
Northern Mali.. Boston: Brill
Academic Publishers
Video uploaded July 19,
2012 by SuperAZAWAD. “La révolte
ignorée d'un peuple.”
15:26
minutes. Dialogue in
Temasheq. Testimony of MNLA Colonel
Machkanani. A history of the
rebellions, government atrocities, and reasons for the rebellions; recorded in
early April, 2012 at Gao.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CF8Ut5LGcsU&feature=relmfu
Video uploaded July 19,
2012 by SuperAZAWAD. “La révolte
ignorée d'un peuple.”
15:26
minutes. Dialogue in
Temasheq. Testimony of MNLA Colonel
Machkanani. A history of the
rebellions, government atrocities, and reasons for the rebellions; recorded in
early April, 2012 at Gao.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CF8Ut5LGcsU&feature=relmfu
